I show that when oligopolistic firms manufacture semidurable goods, second-hand markets can play a key role in supporting collusive behavior. This in spite of the fact that a monopolist manufacturer has an incentive to eliminate second-hand marketsa point made by a number of authors. The idea that second-hand markets facilitate collusion is supported by the many examples in which manufacturers strengthen secondhands markets, e.g. by providing warranty coverage across owners, or by encouraging dealers to accept trade-ins. The intuition is that the prospect of obtaining a high price in a second-hand market increases the demand for new goods. This means that the expectation of a price war unleashed by the violation of a collusive agreement will decrease not only the future prices of the new and used goods but also the current price of the new good, thus making the defection itself less profitable. In this framework, I analyze the role of leasing policies, buyback policies and warranty coverage for used units.
Introduction
In a model with semidurable goods and imperfect competition, I show that second-hand markets make collusion easier to enforce through a purely non-cooperative mechanism. Be- * Special thanks to Bart Lipman, Michael Manove for valuable advice and supports. I wish to thank also Emanuela Ciapanna, Mark Rysman and partecipants in several seminars for comments and suggestions. Any errors are my own. E-mail:paschira@bu.edu cause leasing undermines second-hand markets, selling may dominate leasing from the point of view of firms. In this context, I analyze therefore some other common market policies meant to affect the secondary markets these include buyback policies and warranty coverages for used goods. In particular, I show how those policies can improve the ability of firms to support collusive behavior by increasing the equilibrium price on the second-hand market.
Semidurable goods are those goods whose quality deteriorates over time, so that used units of output have a lower quality than new units. The existence of the second-hand market for semidurable goods is endogenously explained by introducing consumer heterogeneity in the valuation of quality. As units age and quality decreases, the goods are traded from high valuation to low valuation consumers in competitive secondary markets, allowing owners to update to their preferred quality.
The literature on semidurable goods focuses mainly on the role of the second-hand market in a monopoly framework. Waldman (1996a Waldman ( , 1997 , Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) , among others, have underlined the incentive for the monopolist to eliminate the presence of an active second-hand market, that is, to adopt strategies intended to reduce or even eliminate old units of output available to serve as potential substitutes for new units. The logic is that the presence of used units traded in a secondary market constrains the monopolist in terms of the price he can charge for new goods. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) and Waldam (1997) argue that the presence of the second-hand market is effectively eliminated when a durable-goods monopolist implements the leasing policy.
1 However, there are in fact many examples where manufacturers seem to intervene in the opposite direction and enhance an active second-hand market. For example, many manufacturers allow transfers of warranty coverage across owners. Also, car manufacturers encourage dealers to accept trade-ins and policies that seems designed to facilitate transactions in the used market. Infinity and Lexus certify pre-owned vehicles and extend warranty coverage to used cars. IBM, Dell and other computer manufacturers sell refurnished equipment and provide warranties for the used goods. Moreover, durable goods are predominantly sold. A typical explanation that reconciles theory and evidence is that leasing may be infeasible due to moral hazard problems (Mann, 1992; Esteban and Llobet 2005) .
2
The theoretical results mentioned above are based on the assumption that there is a unique producer. However, many markets including those for cars or computers, are characterized by the presence of more than one manufacturer. The interaction among different firms 1 When the monopolist offers an only-leasing policy he actually sells the service flow of the (new or used) goods for the length of the contract period. In such a situation there is practically no second-hand market because no new durable goods are sold on the primary market.
2 Another explanation is to allow consumers' value to vary stochastically over time, even if with the presence of a frictionless second-hand market stochastic shocks do not affect aggregate demand and so it will not change the conclusion from the nonstochastic literature. See Biehl (2001) .
creates new strategic considerations. These lead to the conclusion that selling is preferred to leasing over a wide range of circumstances , because selling strengthens collusion.
3
The intuition behind these findings is that the durability of the goods, the presence of a second-hand market and forward looking agents adds dynamic aspect to demand.
The second-hand market affects the demand of new goods for two reasons:
• The buyers of the new goods can sell them when they become used and the resale value positively influences the demand for new goods (resale effect).
• Used goods constitute a cheap (imperfect) substitute for the new goods and this depresses the demand for new goods (substitution effect).
Given the dynamic aspect of the demand for new goods, the producer takes into account that the amount produced in the current period has also an indirect as well as a direct effect on the current profits. A higher level of current production lowers tomorrow's secondary market price (the current production of new goods adds to the supply in the future secondary market) and erodes the consumers' willingness to pay for a new good today by reducing its resale value. Because the value of a new good today depends on the expected price in tomorrow's secondary market, firm's current profits also depend on its own future production, which can influence the secondary-market price. Consequently, the producer must take into account effects of current, past and future production of all firms in the industry.
In this environment, if firms maintain a collusive price under the threat of a price war, then consumers might foresee price wars in the wake of a defection and hence lower their willingness to pay for a new good. Because of these dynamic aspects of the demand, the strategic interaction among the agents cannot be modeled as a repeated game: the demand faced by the firms today depends on history, both through consumers' expectation and through the stock of used goods available at beginning of each period. In this setting punishments harsher than even grim trigger strategies are possible. By threatening to price below marginal cost in the post-deviation period, competing firms can drive the expected future price of used goods to zero and reduce the profit from new goods in the defection period by completely removing the resale-value component of demand. In contrast, a leasing policy would eliminate the dynamic consideration in consumer decisions and lessen the possibility of collusion: the absence of a second-hand market reduces the punishment that can be inflicted on a defector.
In the real world the durability of semidurable goods is endogenous, so the analysis of optimal durability choice is particularly relevant to my model. Waldman (1996a) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) model the durability choice for a monopolist. They view the degree of durability as the rate at which the quality of the good deteriorates over time. The main conclusion of these works is that the semidurable-goods monopolist is motivated to underinvest in durability 4 , which implies that the quality of used units is set at less than the efficient level. 5 The idea is the same as before: increasing durability makes the new and used products closer substitutes, forcing a lower price for the new goods. In a perfectly competitive setting, however, firms would choose the socially optimal level of durability: there is no incentive for the firms to reduce the level of durability below the socially optimal level because it will not affect the profits. This suggests that the incentive for a durable-goods seller to reduce durability would fall as market power falls 6 so that the level of durability should rise. I will show that greater competition might actually induce firms to increase durability in order to sustain collusion. The intuition is that the equilibrium price of used goods is an increasing function of their durability. It follows that the higher the quality of the used goods the harsher is the punishment that can be imposed on a defector. Related to the present work are the models of Bertrand competition that depart from the repeated-games paradigm. Ausubel and Deneckere (1987) , Gul (1987) , Dutta, Matros and Weibull (2005) show that intertemporal substitutability in demand facilitates collusion, via rational expectations on the part of consumers. Those models analyze the market for infinitely durable goods where there is no possibility of reselling and so no secondary market is available, but consumers make intertemporal substitution, i.e. they decide when to buy the durable goods according to the price expected in the future. The authors show that in comparison with the case of a monopoly for a new durable product, the application of Coase's argument to oligopoly leads to a radically different conclusion: the intertemporal substitution and foresight on behalf of the consumers facilitates, rather than undermines, monopoly pricing in a recurrent market setting. In the present paper the dynamic aspect of demand is introduced by the second-hand market rather than by intertemporal substitution; 4 Instead of choosing the depreciation rate for used units the same result can be achieved by a frequent style changes or upgrades of new goods that reduce the perceived quality of previous units. See Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) and Waldman (1996b Waldman ( , 2003 for further discussions.
5 This is always the case in Waldman (1996a) with two types of consumers. Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) consider a continuum distribution of types and observe that for a given output the monopolist always prefers a lower level of durability than the social planner. The idea is that the monopolist in choosing the durability faces two effects: a resale value and a substitution effect driven by the marginal consumers. The social planner instead looks at the average consumer who consumes used goods and is not affected by the substitution effect. However, the authors show that a monopolist that chooses both the quantity and the durability of the goods might provide a level of durability that is higher, lower or equal to socially optimal level. 6 To my knowledge there are no formal studying about the choice of durability in imperfect competitive settings. Moreover, the discussion about the choice of durability provided by Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) seems to suggest that there is not obvious answer to that question. moreover, the focus of the present paper is to explain why selling may be preferred to leasing and to highlight the importance of the second-hand market and policies intended to influence it in sustaining collusion. The paper is organized as follows: the model is developed in section 2 where the main findings are derived. In section 3, I compare two policies direct to influence the second-hand market: the leasing policy and the buy-back policy. Section 4 analyzes the incentive for the manufacturers to offer warranties that cover used goods. Section 5 concludes.
The Model
We construct an infinite-horizon discrete-time model with a continuum of consumers, one semidurable good and one other good as numeraire. The semidurable good is "new" during the period in which it is produced, "used" during the following period and worthless thereafter. Durability is associated with the quality of used goods. The quality of new units is normalized to 1 and the quality of used units is denoted by α ∈ (0, 1).
On the demand side there are two groups of infinitely lived consumers, denoted by h and l, with masses n h and n l . Consumers in group h have a high willingness to pay θ h for new units and αθ h for used units. Those in group l have a lower willingness to pay for units of each type: θ l < θ h for new units and αθ l < αθ h for used units.
In each period there are two markets: an imperfectly competitive market for new goods and a perfectly competitive market for used goods. The market for used goods allow the highvaluation consumers to trade in their old units for new ones, and it permits low-valuation consumers to purchase used units in every period. All consumers have access to both markets. There are no transaction costs in either market.
In each period the supply of used goods depends on the new goods produced in the previous period. The price in the second-hand market, p U t , is an endogenous variable determined by equating supply and demand. Assume that n h < n l to guarantee that the equilibrium price on the second-hand market is positive. In each period a consumer consumes either zero or one unit of output. The values of all parameters are common knowledge.
The consumption decision is function of the current prices, the price history and the stock of used goods available. Consumers form correct expectations concerning future prices and anticipate that by buying a new product in t they can collect its resale value in t + 1 as extra income. Each consumer's current utility is quasi-linear in income u t = qθ i + y t where q ∈ {1, α} is the quality of the semidurable units and y t is the endowment of income in period t. The lifetime utility of a consumer is given by U = P δ t−1 u t , where δ is the discount factor that is common for all consumers. Given the form of u t , consumers differ only in their preference for quality. Each period each consumer decides whether to consume a new good, to consume a used good or not to consume any good. Since the utility function is quasi-linear and there are no transaction costs, consumers separate their current decision from their future decisions. Therefore, they determine their optimal consumption by simply comparing the flow of utility that they derive from each possible decision. When the decision is to consume a new good, the consumer also derives utility from the ownership of a used good in the following period. In the absence of transaction costs, this utility equals tomorrow's price in the secondary market. Formally consumer θ i determines his optimal consumption choice by solving 7 :
Consumer θ i 's utility gain from consuming new goods in period t is given by
, where δp U t+1 is the discounted resale price of used goods in t+1. His utility gain in consuming used goods is αθ i − p U t . His utility gain is 0 if he does not consume any good. Aggregate demand depends on the current price of new and used goods, as well as the expected price of used goods.
From (1) it is possible to characterize demand as follows:
, no one will buy new goods in period t, so no used goods are available next period on the secondary market.
If
, only the high types buy the new goods.
the high types prefer buying new goods, the low types are indifferent between buying new or used goods. Given the stock s t (≤ n l ) of used goods available on the market, fraction (n l − s t ) of low types buys the new units and s t buys the used goods.
all consumers purchase the new products, so the market of used goods is characterized by an excess supply and p U t = 0 (if any used good is available).
Suppose there are M firms producing semidurable goods. The firms face no capacity constraints and produce the durable good at a constant marginal cost c > 0. All firms simultaneously set their price at beginning of every period and are committed to sell to all interested consumers at that price during that period. Let p N m,t be the price of new goods set by firm m in period t. The lowest price in a period is the market price in that period, 7 For each θ i , we define an endowment variable w θit which is equal to 1 if he endowed with a used good in t (i.e. the consumers bought a new good in period t − 1) and equal to 0 otherwise. Define V t (w θit ) the value of the continuation game for the consumer θ i . The consumer solves the optimal consumption problem by
Notice that his decision is independent of income and, hence, also independent of his endowment. This implies V t+1 (1) = V t+1 (0)+p U t+1 , and using this equality in the previous relation we obtain equation (2) 
and all consumers buy from firms charging that price. If more than one firm sets the price equal to the market price, then sales are split equally between all such firms. All firms are risk neutral and discount future profits by the same discount factor δ f . Hence, each firm's profit in a market period is simply its sales multiplied by the difference between its price and marginal cost. Let D N t be the demand for the new goods in period t, the industry profit function in period t is
Firms know all past prices announced in all earlier periods (in particular, firms hold correct expectation along the induced price path and after unilateral deviations from this path), the stock of used goods available on the market at the beginning of each period as well as the actions chosen by consumers in the past 8 . This information defines the state in the game played by the M firms. A pure behavior strategy for a firm is accordingly a function that specifies a price to set in each period t, conditional upon the state in that period. The timing of the game is as follows. Each period the firms simultaneously announce the price for a new unit of output. A second-hand market opens up where prices on the secondhand market equate supply and demand; the consumers simultaneously decide whether or not to buy a new good and whether or not to buy or sell a used good on the second-hand market.
Firms' and consumers' strategies constitute a subgame perfect equilibrium if in all periods and states each firm maximizes its expected discounted future stream of profits and each consumer maximizes its own utility, given all other players' strategies. Notice that if the current state depends on the stock of used goods available then the strategic interaction is not repeated.
To focus attention on the most relevant cases, the remaining analysis places restrictions on parameter values. We shall assume that the low-type's valuation of new units (including the valuation of the used unit in the subsequent year) is above marginal cost but that firms never finds it profit-maximizing to sell new units to them, so that p
Furthermore, we assume that the high-type's valuation of new and used units differs by more than the marginal cost whereas that of the low types does not:
This condition implies that it would be socially optimal to sell new units to high types even in the presence of an excess supply of used units, but it could never be socially optimal to sell new units to all low types if any used units were available.
Monopoly.
If the producer of the semidurable good is a monopoly, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 The price that maximizes the monopoly present discount profit is p * =
(1 − α) θ h + α (1 + δ) θ l ∀t 10 . The high-type consumers always buy new goods and resell used goods to the low types on the second-hand market. The equilibrium price on the secondary market is p U t = αθ l ∀t.
Proof. The monopolist never sells new units to all consumers. Otherwise, there would be an excess supply of used units on the market with p U t = 0 ∀t. Hence, the maximum price that he could charge for the new product would be p N t = (1 − α) θ l ∀t. This price makes the low types indifferent between buying a new or a used product (see equation (1)). Given the assumed restriction (1 − α) θ l < c, this strategy implies a negative profit
If the monopolist sets a relatively high price, only the high types would buy new units. Given n h < n l , the competitive price on the secondary market would be p U t = αθ l , and the high types would extract all the rent from the low types. From (1), the maximum price that the monopolist can charge leaves the high types indifferent between buying a new or a used good. Therefore
Alternatively, the monopolist could lower the price of new units so as to leave the low types indifferent between buying a new or a used good. This strategy yields a positive price p U t = αθ l in the secondary market (and so a positive resale value component in the demand of new products) and increases the quantity of new goods sold. The stock of used goods in the market would be n l and n h in alternate years. In the periods when the stock of used goods is n l the monopolist sells new goods only to the high types at the price p N t = (1 − α) θ h + α (1 + δ) θ l and the low types wold buy the used goods available on the second-hand market. In the periods when the stock of used goods is n h the monopolist sells new goods to high types and to the fraction (n l − n h ) of low types at the price (1 + αδ) θ l . However, the previous assumptions imply that
so the monopolist maximizes his discount profit by selling new goods only to the high types in every period at the price p
10 I am focus in a market enviroment where the initial conditions have played out their role. Along the analysis, I effectively assume an infinite past.
Oligopoly. Consider now a setting with M firms that want to sustain the monopoly outcome as a subgame-perfect equilibrium in grim trigger strategies. 11 We can define the trigger strategy as follows: firms charge the price p * in every period as long as no firm undercuts this price. When a firm does undercut, they set the price equal to c from that period on. Recall that the demand function depends on the price history of new units, the stock of used goods available and the present and future price of used goods. Thus, a forward-looking consumer anticipating a price war next period will update his expectation about p U t+1 . He anticipates that a price war will lead to an overproduction of new goods depressing the demand of used goods and driving down their equilibrium price. A lower expected price for used goods will reduce the demand for new goods in the defection period. The punishment that follows a unilateral deviation not only affects future payoffs of the defector, but also the defector's payoff in the defection period itself.
In the standard repeated Bertrand game, the ability to support a monopoly-price equilibrium outcome depends on the discount factor. The lower the discount factor, the less effective future punishments are. When the discount factor is too low, it pays a firm to deviate, to take the money and run. In the case of semidurables with secondary markets, however, part of the punishment is immediately effected, and this fact makes it easier to support the monopoly-price outcome.
Proposition 2 For a given number of competitors, M, the minimum discount factor δ * f that supports the equilibrium outcome in which firms set the monopoly-price equilibrium outcome is strictly smaller than the standard Bertrand game.
Proof. Consumers' expectations about future prices in period t are:
Suppose there is a defection. Then, consumers anticipate that p N t+1 = c and it will stay at that level forever. Given (1 − α) θ l ≤ c < (1 + αδ) θ l , the low types are indifferent between buying a new or a used good. From equating the first two expressions in (1), the equilibrium price on the secondary market is p
It is the maximum price that the sellers of used goods can ask for -it leaves the low-type consumers indifferent between buying new or used goods.
11 There are many other equilibria in this game. In particular any price between the monopoly price and the competitive equilibrium price can be sustained in equilibrium. I will focus on the monopoly price to analyze the main idea of the paper.
In the defection period, the high types have a maximum willingness to pay for new goods equal to (1 − α) θ h + αθ l + δp U D < p * 12 . Thus the profit in the defection period is strictly less than the monopoly profit in the industry:
Using the standard argument the grim trigger strategy supports p * in equilibrium if and only if
implies a broader range of the parameters that allows collusive behaviors. In particular for a given numbers of competitor, the minimum discount factor that supports the monopoly outcome in equilibrium is lower than the standard Bertrand game.
In the standard repeated Bertrand game, setting future price to marginal cost is the maximum punishment that can be inflicted on a deviator. A future price below marginal cost would not have a further impact, because the deviator would simply withhold production. However, as shown in proposition 2, the market price anticipated by consumers for the period following that of a unilateral price cut would affect demand in the defection period. Moreover, an anticipated price below marginal cost would reduce demand even more. Because of this effect, absent in repeated games, even harsher punishments than grim trigger strategies are possible, and profits in the defection period can be pushed below what they would have been under grim trigger strategies.
Define the sharp grim trigger strategies as follows: initially all the firms set p * and they continue to do so as long as no firm sets a lower price. In the period after deviation all firms post a price p N t+1 < c to induce p U t+1 = 0. Notice that driving the expected price to zero is the maximum punishment that can be inflicted on the defector: it completely removes the resale value component of the demand in the defection period. Because the profit after the defection period may be negative, I assume that to induce a Nash equilibrium in the stage game of that period all the firms play the collusive price p * in every period starting from t + 2 with probability μ and they price at the marginal cost, c, with probability 1 − μ. I assume (as is common in the repeated game literature) that μ is public. If any firm does not obey the punishment pricing, the others restart the punishment sequence. There is no incentive for any firm to deviate from the punishment pricing. Using the sharp grim trigger strategy, the expectation about the future price will be 12 Notice that
− c´(n h + n l ) so the defector still has no incentive to sell to the low types in the defection period.
The sharp grim trigger strategy is a subgame perfect equilibrium if and only if the following two conditions hold:
The first term in condition (4) is the profit that the defector gets in the defection period. As described in (3), consumers see a price p N t lower than p * and so expect the price of used goods to be zero tomorrow, reducing their willingness to pay for new units in the defection period. The second term is negative and is the loss supported by the firms in the first punishment period. The expression on the right-hand side is the profit that the defecting firm would have earned, if he had not defected. In order to obtain subgame perfection, such severe punishment should be incentive compatible and this is guaranteed by (5). The first term on the left-hand side of (5) represents the profit to each firm during the first punishment period, and the sum of the discounted profits thereafter, evaluated from the first punishment period of obeying the punishment. Because the first term is possibly negative, condition (5) requires this present value to be non-negative; otherwise, firms would do better by pricing at marginal cost forever. The same condition requires the left-hand side to be also non-positive in order to punish the defector more effectively.
Proposition 3
The minimum discount factor, δ * * f , which sustains the monopoly-price equilibrium outcome, is strictly lower under sharp trigger strategies than under grim strategies. Moreover, δ * * f is a decreasing function in the quality of the used goods and in the consumers' discount factor and it is an increasing function in the distance of the consumers' valuation for quality.
Proof. Given θ l ≤ c < (1 + aδ) θ l pricing at marginal cost implies p U D = c − (1 − α) θ l (1 + δ) from period t + 1 onwards. The firms can therefore maximize the punishment and lower the profit in the defection period by setting p N t+1 = (1 − a) θ l 13 in the next period and drive to zero the equilibrium price on the second-hand market.
are respectively the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of the sharp trigger strategies supporting p * as subgame perfect equilibrium. The necessary condition is proven by substituting equation (5) in (4). In order to prove the sufficient condition, notice that the left hand side of (5) is an
is sufficient for the existence of a probability μ ∈ (0, 1) such that condition (5) holds. f (0) < 0 is satisfied by construction and
Suppose there is a defection, the consumers anticipate that in period t + 1, there will be a price war, and p
The maximum price that they are willing to pay for a new good in the defection period is (1 − α) θ h + αθ l < p * . Notice that due to the parameter restrictions, the defector never finds optimal to sell new goods also to the low-taste consumers in the defection period (at the price p N D = θ l ). The profit in the defection period is strictly less than the monopoly profit in the industry. Each firm prefers colluding if and only if
0, so the minimum discount factor that sustains the monopoly outcome in equilibrium is strictly lower under the sharp trigger strategies.
Moreover, the last part of the proposition is shown by 14 Notice that in the period after the punishment there is an excess supply of used goods so the equilibrium price on the second-hand market is zero.
< 0,
The proposition suggests that a higher quality of used goods implies a higher resale value effect and a harsher punishment in case of defection. This finding implies that an increase in the number of competitors entering in the market might induce firms to increase the durability of the goods to enforce collusion. We can imagine a situation in which in a pre-stage game firms decide the quality of the used goods by making an investment in R&D. The literature about investment in R&D 15 suggests that competition among firms lead to an overinvestment in R&D with respect to the level that maximizes the profitability of the group. Each firm takes into account the benefits from its investment, but not the positive externality due to the reduction on the value of rivals' investment. The results in the model seem to confirm those findings: the possibility of collusion might lead to an over investment in durability with respect to level that maximizes the monopoly profit. If the number of competitors continues to increase eventually the firms will end up choosing a level of durability beyond the socially optimal level.
Remark 4 Until here the analysis has been done under the initial restriction of the parameters which implies that the monopolist maximizes the profit by selling new goods only to the high types:
. However, the above discussion points out an interesting implication: an increase in competition followed by an increase in durability might reverse the previous inequality 16 so that firms collude and sell new goods also to the low-type consumers. Therefore, we have a situation in which competition increases the quantity of goods sold while firms are still colluding in a Bertrand fashion by charging p N = (1 + αδ) θ l .
Proposition 3 also suggests that a wider difference in the consumers' valuation for quality makes the resale effect relatively less important for the high-valuation consumers' demand of new goods (the equilibrium price on the secondary market is function of the θ l ) and the punishment less effective. Finally notice that when consumers are sufficiently patient, they value more the resale component in the decision of buying new products, so that the expectation of a price war will induce a considerable adjustment in their willingness to pay for them. This implies lower deviation payoffs and collusion is therefore easier to enforce. 15 See Reinganum (1989) , Hirshleifer and Riley (1979) , Waldman (2003) for a survey. 16 Observe that
In the above analysis I consider the situation without transaction costs (T ) but is not difficult to extend the analysis to include transaction costs on the secondary market. For sufficiently small transaction costs the second-hand market is still open. If the transaction costs are supported by the consumers that buy used goods is intuitive to derive that the equilibrium price of used units is a decreasing function of the transaction cost (p U t = αθ l − T, ∀t). A marginal increase in the transaction costs will reduce the resale value effect and the ability to punish a defector ( ∂γ ∂T > 0). Hence the presence of transaction costs will not only reduce the firms' profitability 17 but also their ability to collude. This result is in line with the main findings of the present work: firms might prefer to have an active and frictionless second-hand market.
3 The role of the leasing and the buy-back policies
In this section I will discuss how different policies that interfere with it affect the collusive behavior in the Bertrand game. As we discussed in the introduction, used goods are cheap substitutes for new goods. Thus, closing the second-hand market may in principle be a profitable decision. Waldman (1997) and Hendel and Lizzeri (1999) show how the monopolist benefits the most by leasing the new goods rather than selling them. 18 The leasing contracts achieve the result of having no active second-hand market because the firms keep the ownership of new goods. With leasing contracts, the manufacturer is able to sell just the flow of service derived from the products. The leasing policy, however, breaks the dynamic investment considerations into consumption decisions and lessens the firms' ability to collude. Another policy that manufacturers can implement to increase their market power is the buy-back policy. Manufacturers offer a fixed amount of money to buy back cars form those consumers willing to trade them in and buy new ones . The incentive for the firms is to stimulate the demand for new products by increasing the resale value effect and making used goods more expensive substitute for new ones. With leasing, the monopolist keeps the ownership of the good and decides whether to lease used goods, so there is no active second-hand market and no dynamic consideration are involved in the consumers' decision process. With the buyback, the manufacturer is still able to control the amount of used 17 See for example Porter and Sattler (1999) or Anderson and Ginsburgh (1994) for a formal derivation of the equilibrium with transaction costs.
18 This result is obtained in a simple framework where there are no transaction costs no lemon problems on the second-hand market or moral hazard behavior. As described by Hendel and Lizzeri (2002) and Huang, S., Yang, Y. and K. Anderson. (2001) , in a more realistic model with transaction costs and/or hidden information, the firm prefers to offer a mix of leasing and selling contracts.
cars available but he leaves the second-hand market active. This preserves the intertemporal feature of the demand for new goods and makes collusion easier to enforce.
The leasing policy
Monopoly. We start the analysis by looking at monopoly behavior. Suppose that the monopolist decides to lease new goods for one period (instead of selling them) to gain additional power in the used market. The monopolist retains the ownership of the goods that have to be returned at the end of the contract. The consumers' decision to rent a new product does not depend on the resale value, but just on the substitution effect, i.e. the possibility of renting used goods instead of new ones. Consumer θ i determines his optimal consumption choice by solving:
Of course the demand for new goods has no dynamic features. The maximum leasing fee that the monopolist can charge for a used good is l U t = αθ l to make the low types indifferent between rent or not a used unit. Consequently the leasing fee for a new product can be at most l
Overall the monopolist's profit is higher than the selling case and equal to ((1 − α)θ h + αθ l − c + αθ l ) n h . However, he can decide not to rent the used goods and extract all the surplus from the high types by posting l N t = θ h . The latter is better than the former strategy if
19 . In this case no used goods are available for the low-types consumers. Observe how with or without used goods for rent the monopoly profit is strictly higher than selling.
Oligopoly. We can define the trigger strategies supporting a constant collusive leasingprice pair © l N , l U ª (or just l N if no used goods are rented) as follows: all firms set the price
in the initial period and continue to do so in all future periods as long as no firm undercuts these prices. After a defection firms set the leasing price for new goods equal to c and the leasing price for used goods equal to zero.
Proposition 5 As in the standard repeated-game model the minimum discount factor that allows the equilibrium outcome in which firms set the monopoly price is function only of the number of competitors, γ l = 1.
Proof. The introduction of the leasing policy breaks the dynamic consideration in the demand for new goods. The defector can undercut marginally both the leasing fee for new and used good and collect all the profit in the industry. Each firm prefers a collusive behavior if
The condition is equal to the usual condition that we have in the standard repeated game model where γ l = 1.
The above result suggests that even if leasing achieves a higher monopoly profit than selling, for a given set of parameters, the monopoly outcome with leasing cannot be sustained in equilibrium, whereas it is sustainable with selling. Firms that interact in a Bertrand fashion will therefore prefer the latter to the former strategy in order to collect a positive profit.
The buy-back policy
Monopoly. The monopolist can try to increase profit by interfering with the second-hand market and gain additional market power by using the buy-back policy. The firm commits to buy and scrap used cars for a given price.
If the monopolist decides to apply the policy, the price offered to buy the used cars back cannot be lower than the market price of used goods. Consumer θ i determines his optimal consumption choice by solving:
where b U is the price at which firm commits to buyback the used units.
Proposition 6
For θ h > 1+δ δ θ l the buyback policy leads to a higher profit than selling. The equilibrium is characterized as it follows: b * = αθ h and p * = (1 + αδ) θ h ∀t, all the high-types consumers buy the new good every period and resell it to the firm the next period.
Proof. We have seen that the monopolist maximizes his profit when he sells new goods to the high-taste consumers. In that situation the equilibrium price on the secondary market is equal to αθ l . In order to affect the secondary market the monopolist has to commit and offer a buyback price b U ∀t at least equal to αθ l , below this threshold no consumers will sell the used good to the firm and the policy is not binding.
The maximum price for new goods that a high taste consumer is willing to pay is given by the following equality:
There are two relevant ranges of values for b. If the monopolist commits to
then in each period the monopoly price is p N = (1 + αδ) θ h and his profit is ¡ p N − c ¢ n h minus the cost of carrying out the policy, b · n h (the cost of buying back the used goods available on the market). Notice that the profit function is strictly increasing in b U :
U and the cost of the policy is still b U · n h , now the profit is strictly decreasing in b U . This implies that the optimal strategy for the monopolist is b * = αθ h and p * = (1 + αδ) θ h . In each period high-taste consumers will sell the used goods to the monopoly and buy new goods. It follows that the monopoly profit is ((1 + αδ) θ h − c) n h − αθ h n h and no used goods are available for low-taste consumers. The monopoly profit is higher than the standard situation if
Initial assumptions implies that the monopolist never finds profitable to apply the buy-back policy and sell the new goods also to the low-type consumers.
This result shows how the monopolist can profitably interfere with the second hand market in order to gain extra profit. The role of the buyback is to positively influence the resale value effect by increasing the price of used cars. The policy is profitable if the there is a substantial difference in the consumers valuation for the quality of the goods so that the cost of implementing the policy is lower than the benefit.
Notice that having no used goods available is a particular feature of the model with two types of consumers. With a continuum distribution of consumers, used goods are always traded on the second-hand market.
Oligopoly. The firms can collude and sustain the monopoly buy-back equilibrium outcome with commitment using the sharp grim trigger strategies. Initially all the firms ask p * and offer to buy-back used units at b * and they continue to do so as long as no firm defects. After a defection all firms post a price p N t+1 ≤ c to induce p U t+1 = 0 and the buy-back price is no longer offered. As described in the previous section, because the profit after the defection period may be negative to induce a Nash equilibrium in the stage game of that period I assume that with probability μ all the firms play the collusive equilibria offering {p * , b * } from period t + 2 onwards and with probability 1 − μ they price at the marginal cost, c, without the buy-back policy. If any firm does not obey the punishment pricing in a punishment period, the others restart the punishment sequence. Using the sharp trigger strategy expected future prices will be
Notice that in the defection period the firm that under-cut p * has no incentive to offer a buyback price so the used goods are sold on the second-hand market at the price p
, that sustain the equilibrium outcome in which firms set the monopoly prices {p * , b * } is strictly lower than δ * * f discussed in proposition 3.
As before we can define
It is straightforward to observe that γ b < γ * * < 1, the numerator is the same as before and the denominator is strictly higher.
The statement follows given that the minimum discount factor that sustains collusion is an increasing function of γ. Similar necessary and sufficient conditions can be derived for the existence of the sharp grim trigger strategy that support the monopoly bay-back equilibrium outcome as subgame perfect equilibrium.
The buyback policy not only can increase the profit with respect to selling -the level of profit is still lower than leasing because the second-hand market is indirectly controlled by the firms-, but it enlarges the number of firms M that can profitable enforce the collusive equilibrium.
Extended warranties for used goods
As I have discussed in the introduction, car and computer manufacturers provide extended warranties for used goods across owners in order to improve the transaction on the secondhand market. The incentives to give extended warranties might be twofold. First, if the resale value effect dominates the substitution effect the firms can collude and achieve a higher profit by increasing the average quality of the used goods. Moreover, independently from the previous condition, oligopoly firms have incentive to offer a warranty in order to enforce collusion (charge the monopoly price). By increasing the average quality of the used goods, the firms increase the punishment that they can inflict to a defector in the defection period making defection itself less profitable.
The only change with respect to the model presented in the previous sections is about the quality of the used goods. Assume that in the second period the quality of the good is α ∈ (0, 1) with probability ϕ ∈ (0, 1) and 0 with probability (1 − ϕ) . I assume, moreover, that the quality of the used goods is realized after the transactions take place on the markets. In this way there are no concerns about asymmetric information on the used market. Each firm may offer the following warranty when they sell a new product: if the quality of the used goods in the second period is 0, they can reinstate the quality α. The firms support a cost k for each product fixed.
Monopoly. By opportunely modifying the initial restriction on the parameters a monopolist will find optimal to sell new goods only to the high taste consumers. Without warranty, the price on the second-hand market in such a situation will be p u t = ωϕθ l for every t. So that the price of a new unit of output that maximizes the monopolist profit is p * =
(1 − αϕ) θ h +αϕ (1 + δ) θ l and the profit (p * − c) n h . If the monopolist offers a warranty then the equilibrium price on the secondary market is p u t = aθ l and p w = (1 − α) θ h + α (1 + δ) θ l on the primary market, the per-period profit is (p w − c − kϕ) n h . The monopolist has incentive to offer the warranty if the resale value effect is bigger then the substitution effect and the cost of reinstating the quality of the goods,
Oligopoly. The firms can collude and sustain the monopoly price, p w , with warranty in equilibrium using sharp trigger strategies. Initially all the firms ask p w and offer the warranty, they continue to do so as long as no firm defects. After a defection all firms post a price p N t+1 ≤ c so to induce p U t+1 = 0 and no warranty is offered, from period t + 2 onward all the firms play the collusive price p w with probability μ and with probability 1 − μ they price at the marginal cost, c, without the warranty. If any firm does not obey the punishment pricing in a punishment period, the others restart the punishment sequence. As before, using the sharp trigger strategy the expectation about the future price will be pricing with warranty in equilibrium using the sharp grim trigger strategy. The minimum discount factor, δ w f , that sustain the monopoly outcome with warranty is strictly lower than without warranty.
Proof. The necessary condition, (p w − c − kϕ) n h ≥ 0, implies that the firms still make a positive profit by offering the warranty. Notice that p w is not necessarily bigger than p * because the substitution effect might dominate the resale value effect. Moreover, observe that γ w − γ = − αδθ l ((θ h − c) (1 − ϕ) + kϕ 2 ) (p w − c) (p * − c) < 0, so that the minimum discount factor that sustains the monopoly equilibrium outcome is strictly lower with the warranty, where γ w = (1 − α) θ h + αθ l − c − kϕ (1 − α) θ h + α (1 + δ) θ l − c − kϕ and γ = (1 − αϕ) θ h + αϕθ l − c (1 − αϕ) θ h + αϕ (1 + δ) θ l − c .
The previous proposition suggests that if the number of competitors is such that given the discount factor δ f the monopoly outcome without warranty cannot be sustained as subgame perfect equilibrium in sharp grim trigger strategies (δ f < 1 − 1 γM ) 20 , firms have incentive to offer the warranty and charge p w even if condition (8) is not met in order to collect a positive profit. An interesting aspect of the previous result is that the Bertrand game does not just lead to two equilibrium outcomes: the monopoly outcome (if there is collusion) and the perfect competitive one (if collusion is not enforceable). 21 Here, we have an intermediate situation in which firms still have monopoly power and they are able to collude, but they achieve a second-best result. The competition forces them to offer a warranty for used goods even if it is not optimal from the monopolist's point of view. The idea is similar to the discussion pointed out in the remark 4.
Conclusion
The aim of the present work is to analyze how the second-hand market and the policies directed to affect it may improve the firms' ability to enforce collusion in a semi-durable goods setting. The intuition comes by observing that in a durable-goods market the presence of the second-hand market introduces dynamic considerations into consumer decisions. I develop a model of intertemporal demand and I analyze collusive pricing under Bertrand competition. A more competitive environment explains the advantage of selling over leasing and offers an alternative explanation to the choice of higher level of durability. The model could be made richer by introducing transaction costs or asymmetric information on the secondary market. The presence of these elements should make sales strategies less effective in enforcing collusion, as discussed at the end of section 2. They both will reduce the equilibrium price on the secondary market, however in this context, buyback policies or warranty coverages will play an important role in reducing such effects.
